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ABSTRACT
Reports of the feats of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh have sparked rapid
growth in budgets devoted to microfinance as a tool to reduce poverty in both rich and
poor countries. But has Grameen been a cost-effective use of scarce funds earmarked
for development? To answer this, I compare outputs to social costs in a present-value
framework adapted to microfinance organizations. For a social investor in the time
frame 1983-97, the cost of a person-year of membership in Grameen was about $20.
Likewise, the cost of a dollar-year of borrowed purchasing power was about $0.22.
Although I do not measure social benefits, most evidence suggests that benefits exceed
these estimates of costs. Grameen—if not necessarily other microfinance
organizations—was probably a good social investment.
1A COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
OF THE GRAMEEN BANK OF BANGLADESH
1. Introduction
In rich and poor countries worldwide, microfinance—defined as efforts to
improve access to loans and to saving services for low-income, low-wealth people—may
be the fastest-growing and best-known tool to combat poverty. A survey of 200 of the
thousands of microfinance organizations in the third world found 13 million loans worth
$7 billion and 45 million savings accounts worth $19 billion (Paxton, 1996). In the
United States, the number of microfinance organizations—and their budgets—has
grown exponentially in the past decade (U.S. Newswire, 1999; Meyerhoff, 1997;
Severens and Kays, 1997; Clark and Huston, 1993). The growth will not stop soon—a
new movement seeks more than $20 billion for microfinance for self-employment for 100
million of the poorest families in the world by 2005 (Microcredit Summit, 1996).
The spark for microfinance is the story of the Grameen (Village) Bank of
Bangladesh. Founded in 1976, by 1997 Grameen had a portfolio of $260 million and 2.3
million members, most of them very poor, more than 90 percent of them women, and
all of them rural. More than 98 percent of payments due had been collected, and the
average disbursement in 1997 was $170, 60 percent of per-capita income. In a landscape
littered with failed development projects, Grameen has thrived and relieved some of the
almost constant misery due to floods and cyclones, a corrupt government, norms that
2restrict the movement of women, and abysmal income and wealth.
Microfinance has caught fire worldwide. In Bangladesh, clones of Grameen have
2.5 million members. Transplants have been made to Africa, other parts of Asia, and
Latin America (Wall Street Journal, 1998; Thomas, 1995; Getubig, Johari, and Thas,
1993; Hulme, 1990). In the United States, the Grameen model has been suggested for
the homeless and for the ghetto (Banerjee, 1998; Soloman, 1992; Balkin, 1992 and
1989). Well-publicized experiments run in Chicago and rural Arkansas (Taub, 1998;
Mondal and Tune, 1993; Balkin, 1993; Servon, 1992).
Microfinance spread quickly across the globe because few other tools promise to
fight poverty as effectively (Morduch, 1999a). But does microfinance really work? And
if it does, then is it so effective that it should crowd out other development projects
(Buckley, 1997; Rogaly, 1996)? After all, the poor can gain from better financial
services, but they can also gain from, for example, better food, water, roads, or shelter.
As it turns out, no one knows whether Grameen—let alone microfinance in
general—has been a cost-effective use of scarce resources earmarked to help the poor.
All past studies that purport to measure the social costs of Grameen have deep flaws
(Khalily, Imam, and Khan, 1999; Morduch, 1999b; Hashemi, 1997; Yaron, Benjamin,
and Piprek, 1997; Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Khandker, Khalily, and Khan, 1995;
Benjamin, 1994; Yaron, 1992a). Some fail to adjust for cash gifts counted as revenue,
some fail to impute an opportunity cost to resources priced outside of the market, and
all fail to discount cash flows through time. Likewise, all studies that attempt to
3measure the social benefits of Grameen have profound weaknesses (Khandker, 1998 and
1996; Khandker, Samad, and Khan, 1998; Larance, 1998; Morduch, 1998; Pitt and
Khandker, 1998; Schuler, Hashemi, and Riley, 1997). Some fail to control for
participant self-selection or for non-random placement of branches, some fail to control
for what would have happened without Grameen, and all fail to measure more than a
few of the multiple aspects of social benefits. These shortfalls are due not to a lack of
competence or effort but rather to the difficulty of measurement.
Has Grameen been a good social investment? If Grameen, one of the best
microfinance organizations, has not been a good social investment, then it would douse
hope for most other microfinance organizations and for microfinance in general.
In this paper, I compare outputs with social costs in the first measurement of
the cost-effectiveness of Grameen in a standard present-value framework. I use outputs
rather than benefits because outputs are much simpler to measure. I take social costs
as the present value of cash flows between public entities and Grameen.
I find that, as seen by a social investor in a time frame that starts in 1983 and
ends in 1997, Grameen produced a person-year of membership at a cost of about $20.
Likewise, Grameen produced a dollar-year of borrowed purchasing power at a cost of
about $0.22. I do not measure social benefits, but most evidence suggests that they
exceed these estimates of social costs. Thus, I conclude that Grameen has likely been a
good social investment. The results apply only to Grameen; other microfinance
organizations—and microfinance as a whole—may or may not be as cost-effective.
4The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines how Grameen
works. Section 3 describes a framework to measure the social benefits of microfinance. I
then adjust the framework to measure discounted outputs. Section 4 presents a
framework to measure the social costs of subsidized microfinance organizations. Section
5 discusses the meaning of the results for Grameen and for the microfinance movement.
52. How Grameen works
Now this is how the birth of Grameen came about. Fresh from graduate school
in the United States, a professor of economics at Chittagong University grew frustrated
with abstract blackboard theory as he watched people starve in the famine of 1974
(Yunus, 1998). One day in his quest to find a way to help, he met a bamboo weaver
who, for want of less than $1, was enthralled to a moneylender. From his own pocket,
the professor lent an average of $0.64 to the weaver and to 41 others. The borrowers
repaid their loans and improved their lots, and in 1976, Grameen was born. By the
time it became a bank in October 1983, Grameen had 36,000 borrowers and a portfolio
of $3.1 million (all monetary figures are in dollars as of December 1998). In 1983-97,
the size of Grameen doubled about six times.
Behind the miracle story, however, lies the design of a set of products and
incentives that let Grameen make and collect very small loans to very poor people who
cannot post physical assets as collateral. This purpose of this section is to describe the
nuts and bolts of the operations that drive the tale of success.
2.1 Membership
New members are placed in groups of five, and five to eight groups form a
centre. All members in the centre meet with a loan officer weekly. For the first few
weeks, they learn about Grameen, save $0.02 a week, learn to sign their names, and
memorize a set of vows to self-improvement. Each group elects a chair, and each centre
6elects a chief. New members must also buy a share of stock in Grameen for 100 taka or
about $2 (1 dollar was worth 48.5 taka in December 1998).
2.2 Loans
Risk haunts lenders; all borrowers promise to repay, but, whether due to choice
or to constraint, some break their promise. To control risk, most lenders require that
borrowers post collateral, an asset that the borrower loses upon default and that thus
motivates repayment. Most formal lenders require assets—such as land, houses, or
bank balances—that the poor, because they are poor, either do not have or cannot
afford to lose.
The innovation of Grameen—and of most microfinance lenders—is to take as
collateral the asset of future access to loans. Thus, microfinance in poor countries
works a lot like credit cards in rich countries; most borrowers repay because they want
to preserve their future access to loans.
Although Grameen did not invent the threat of termination as an incentive to
fulfill contracts (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983), it did popularize its combination with a
second design element: joint liability. This means that default by one group member
leads to banishment for all members. This leverage of the threat of termination can
reduce risk in three ways (Conning, 1998; Wenner, 1995; Huppi and Feder, 1990). First,
joint liability gives members a selfish reason to exclude known bad risks. Knowledge of
individual character is costly to outsiders but is often a sunk cost for villagers. Thus
7joint liability can cut the costs of the lender to screen potential borrowers. Second,
members have an incentive to make sure that their fellows do not squander their loans.
This can cut the costs of the lender to monitor active borrowers. Third, members have
a reason to coax comrades out of arrears or even to repay their debts for them. This
can cut the costs of the lender to enforce repayment. On the downside, joint liability
may lead to domino effects in which borrowers who would have repaid choose instead
to default because they would lose access anyway due to the default of others (Paxton,
Graham, and Thraen, 1999; Besley and Coate, 1995). Also, joint liability may not cut
total costs but rather only shift costs from lenders to borrowers.
Because joint liability lets the poor bank on their social capital (Gomez, 1999;
Servon, 1998), it has captured the imagination of the public. Because joint liability
involves repeated games between heterogeneous agents with imperfect information, it
has drawn attention from theoretical economists (Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990). Joint
liability at Grameen, however, is more subtle than the popular perception and more
complex than the theory.
First, Grameen staggers disbursements to leverage further the threat of
termination. Two members get loans first, then two more members get loans one month
later. After one more month, the last member gets a loan (Hashemi, 1997). Because
most loans last exactly one year, staggered disbursement reduces the risk of domino
default because some borrowers must finish repayment before they know whether their
8comrades will default. Furthermore, borrowers who have paid most of their debts have
incentives to make sure that their peers also repay on time.
Second, loan officers often do not enforce strict joint liability at the group level.
They tend to bend the rules both because they know that some arrears are involuntary
and because they are reluctant to kick out good borrowers (Rahman, 1999; Woolcock,
1999). To enforce repayment in the absence of strict joint liability at the group level,
loan officers draw on social pressure at the centre level. For example, they may suspend
all disbursements at a centre until all debts are up-to-date. They may also scold the
women or detain them in the centre longer than normal. In Bangladesh, this shames
women and may subject them to the wrath of their husbands when they finally are
released (Rahman, 1999; Ito, 1998).
Third, Grameen implicitly promises bigger loans through time. New borrowers
get very small loans, but loan size usually grows as they repay and prove their
creditworthiness. Most borrowers get a new loan as soon as they cancel their old one.
Fourth and finally, Grameen promises more attractive types of loans to the best
borrowers. The most common loan is the “general” loan, but since 1984, Grameen has
also made “housing” loans with bigger disbursements, longer terms, and lower interest
rates. Recently, Grameen made a quantum leap to loans for college expenses and for
cell phones (Zwingle, 1998). Grameen even makes individual loans (Dowla, 1998).
Access to these loans is worth a lot to borrowers, so the centres—and especially the
centre chiefs—try to maintain a clean record.
92.3 Forced savings
Unlike most microfinance organizations, Grameen takes deposits. In practice,
however, saving is compulsory and withdrawals are restricted. The forced savings fund
reserves that members can borrow against in emergencies and that Grameen can tap in
the case of default. Saving accounts in Grameen resemble insurance contracts more
than passbook accounts.
Grameen has four types of forced savings (Morduch, 1999b; Khandker, Khalily,
and Khan, 1995). The first two types are not really savings at all but rather fees that
members will never get back. After their first loan, members must pay 2 cents each
week to support schools run by the centre. They must also pay 0.5 percent of
disbursements in excess of $20 into a fund used to cover losses from default.
The last two types of forced savings are real savings. Members must deposit 4
cents each week into Personal Savings. Interest accrues at 8.5 percent, and withdrawals
are unrestricted. In addition, 5 percent of each disbursement goes to the Group Fund.
It also earns 8.5 percent. Modeled on informal group funds (Bouman, 1995), the Group
Fund is supposed to be controlled by the centre and used for emergency loans to
members. In practice, loan officers often control the fund, and they use it to insure
Grameen against default (Matin, 1997). Grameen also makes loans from the Group
Fund after floods. Members cannot withdraw their savings in the Group Fund until
they leave Grameen or until they have ten years of membership.
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In sum, most “savings” are like fees for insurance or for loan-loss reserves. As
members approach ten years of membership, however, the chance to withdraw what
has grown to be a large sum serves as a further incentive to repay as promised.
Voluntary savings from members are small. This is unfortunate; to escape from
poverty means to build assets, and although some people can build assets through
debt, even more people can build assets through savings (Sherraden, 1991). Some of the
poor are creditworthy, but all are depositworthy. Grameen could improve its attempts
to relieve poverty through the supply of flexible, voluntary savings services decoupled
from debt (Rutherford, 1998).
2.4 Non-financial products
Grameen aims to change the social and economic structure of rural Bangladesh.
To do this, it supplies, in addition to loans and insurance, what it calls discipline
(Montgomery, 1996; Khandker, Khalily, and Khan, 1995). This encompasses not only
the financial discipline to comply with repayments and forced deposits each week, but
also physical discipline: members must sit in straight rows, salute, chant, and
sometimes perform calisthenics (Hashemi, 1997).
The vows that members recite also instill discipline in that they foster a break
from the social norms that help to perpetuate misery in rural Bangladesh. For example,
the resolutions praise small families, prohibit dowry and child marriage, promote
gardens, extol education, and exhort members to drink clean water and to use latrines.
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Perhaps the most important non-financial service of Grameen is social
intermediation (Bennett, 1998; Edgcomb and Barton, 1998). In essence, social
intermediation produces social capital as a by-product of the requirement to meet once
a week. In rural Bangladesh, social capital is scarce; the custom of purdah isolates
women from men and from markets. Membership in Grameen gives women a socially
accepted excuse to gather and to talk (Larance, 1998). The impacts are both
psychological and economic; not only do women feel less isolated, but they also
strengthen their support networks for when trouble strikes. Financial services prompt
the meeting, but any type of frequent meeting would likely have the same effect.
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3. A framework to measure social benefits
What are the social benefits of the services just described? This section lays out
a framework that integrates six distinct-but-linked aspects of the social benefits of
microfinance: worth to users, cost to users, depth, breadth, length, and scope
(Schreiner, 1999). Because worth, cost, and depth are difficult to measure, I also show
how to adjust the framework to use only measurements of outputs.
3.1 Six aspects of social benefits
3.1.1 Worth to users
Worth to users is defined as their willingness to pay. This does not suppose that
users can pay nor that they should pay. Rather, it supposes that a change in well-being
due to microfinance can be expressed in terms of dollars. For example, if a woman were
willing to bear costs of up to $200 to get a year of membership in Grameen, then she
would be just as well off with $200 more income as with a costless year of membership.
Worth is a simple concept, but its subjectiveness makes it very difficult to measure.
The literature on Grameen does not contain any complete measure of worth to users.
Theoretical models often assume that worth to users is equal to the increase in
business profits due to access to finance. In fact, microfinance may improve well-being
even if it does not increase business profits, supposing that users even have businesses
in the first place. For example, savings may buffer shocks, and loans may fund life-
cycle events such as weddings or funerals. Often the most important effect of
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microfinance is to help households to diversify their sources of income (Mosley and
Hulme, 1998; Raheim and Foster Alter, 1998; Dunn, 1997; Servon, 1996).
3.1.2 Cost to users
Cost to users is defined as the sum of price costs and transaction costs. Price
costs are defined as direct cash payments to a microfinance organization. Price costs
borne by users are revenue for the organization.
Transaction costs are defined as non-price costs. They include both non-cash
opportunity costs—such as the time to meet each week—and indirect cash expenses for
such things as transport and documents linked to the use of microfinance. In Grameen,
non-cash opportunity costs probably exceed indirect cash expenses. Furthermore, total
transaction costs often swamp price costs (Bhatt and Tang, 1998; Adams, 1995;
Cuevas, 1988). Transaction costs are not revenue for the organization.
The concepts of cost to users, cost of supply, and cost to society are distinct.
Cost of supply is the opportunity cost of the resources used to produce microfinance.
Cost to society encompasses cost to users, cost of supply, and any other costs to non-
users. For example, users of microfinance may squeeze non-users out of markets.
3.1.2.1 Estimates of costs to users of Grameen
Transaction costs can be derived from survey data on the miles, minutes, and
money needed to use microfinance. No one has estimated Grameen’s transaction costs.
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Price costs are best estimated not as the nominal stated interest rate but rather
as the real effective interest rate, defined as the annualized, inflation-adjusted discount
rate such that the cash flows from the use of microfinance have a present value of zero.
To estimate this for a typical borrower of Grameen requires several assumptions. First,
inflation is 5 percent, the average in Bangladesh in 1988-97 (Table 1). Second, the
member buys a share for 100 taka when she joins, and gets her first loan four weeks
later. Third, she gets 10 “general” loans, each with an annual nominal stated interest
rate of 20 percent (14 percent in real terms) and 52 equal installments that start one
week after disbursement. Fourth, in the absence of data on loan size by number of past
loans, I assume that the first loan is for 1,000 taka and that each subsequent loan
increases by 1,500 taka. Fifth, the borrower makes all payments on time, makes no
withdrawals from Personal Savings, and does not borrow from the Group Fund.
Seventh, the borrower leaves Grameen after ten years, sells her share, and withdraws
the $150 that has accumulated in Personal Savings and in the Group Fund.
These assumptions imply that the present value of cash flows is zero when the
weekly discount rate is 0.711 percent. The real effective interest rate is
(52·0.00711!0.05)/(1+0.05) Ñ 30 percent (Rosenberg, 1996). This matches the estimate
in Hossain (1988). Thus the structure of forced savings makes the real effective interest
rate more than twice as big as the real stated interest rate.
The structure of forced savings also has a big effect on reported profits. Grameen
counts cash inflows from forced savings not as revenue but as increases in liabilities. If
 Of course, expenses would also increase when Grameen refunds Personal1
Savings and the Group Fund.
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these flows were counted as fees or interest, then revenues would almost double and
reported profits would increase more than a hundredfold even though cash flows for
users would not change.  In fact, the real yield on the portfolio might approach 301
percent, the range in which estimates based on the method of Yaron (1992b) suggest
that Grameen might become subsidy-independent (Morduch, 1999b; Schreiner, 1997).
Why doesn’t Grameen make this seemingly cosmetic change? In short, Grameen
wants to hide costs to users and to post low profits. Low interest rates distance its
image from that of the moneylenders that it aims to replace. Furthermore, if Grameen
posted huge profits, then the government might make it pay taxes and donors might
ask whether the poor bear too much cost. The current structure provides strong cash
flows without the appearance of excessive profits or high stated interest rates.
3.1.2.2 Net gain to users
Net gain to users is defined as worth minus cost, the change in well-being due to
microfinance. In essence, net gain is like consumer surplus in welfare theory, the
difference between the highest cost that a user would agree to bear and the cost borne.
People choose to use microfinance because they expect positive net gains.
Although the size of net gain is usually unknown because its measurement requires
knowledge of both worth and cost, its sign can be inferred from repeated use; if users
go back for more, then net gain must be positive. The annual drop-out rate at Grameen
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from 1986 to 1994 was about 5 percent (Khandker, Khalily, and Khan, 1995). This
suggests that most users received positive net gains from membership.
3.1.3 Depth
Depth is defined as the social value of net gains that accrue to a given user. In
welfare theory, depth corresponds to the weight of a user in the social-welfare function.
If society has a preference for the poor, then poverty is a good proxy for depth.
In principle, only people in households with less than half an acre of land or with
assets worth less than an acre of land can join Grameen. In practice, some members
have more wealth than this (Matin, 1998; Morduch, 1998). Although most members are
not among the poorest of the poor—defined as those with an income less than half the
poverty line—most are still very poor, and almost all are women (Hashemi, 1997).
3.1.4 Breadth
Breadth is defined as the number of users. Breadth matters because the poor are
many but the development dollars are few. With more than 2.3 million members, more
than 2.1 million borrowers, and centres in more than half of the villages in Bangladesh,
Grameen has extensive breadth. 
3.1.5 Length
Length is defined as the time frame of the supply of microfinance. Expected
length matters because society cares about the well-being of the poor both now and in
the future. A common proxy for length is the ability to attract grants or soft loans from
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government or donors or, in the absence of perpetual subsidies, the ability to earn
enough profit to maintain the real value of equity.
In 1997, Grameen reported a before-tax profit of about $300,000. Without
subsidies, this profit would become a loss $23 million and the sum of losses since 1983
would be about $183 million (Section 4 below). But Grameen does get subsidies and
will continue to do so. Even if Grameen lost its subsidies, I expect that it probably
could make the adjustments needed to survive long into the future.
3.1.6 Scope
Scope is defined as the number of types of services supplied. For example, a
microfinance organization that offers both loans and savings services has greater scope
than one that offers only loans. Furthermore, scope increases with the variety and
flexibility of the terms of a given type of financial contract; a one-year loan for $100 is
a different product than a two-year loan for $100 (Adams, 1994).
Grameen has great scope in some ways and weak scope in others. It does supply
savings services, but almost all savings are forced, and withdrawal is often impossible.
For loans, the amount disbursed increases with time, and Grameen has invented new
types of loans to complement the workhorse “general” loan. For a given type of loan,
however, the term and the repayment plan are fixed for all borrowers.
Socialbenefits' b ' W[D111(w111!c111), ... ,DTSTNTST
(wTSTNTST
!cTSTNTST
)].
Socialbenefits' b ' j
T
t'1
j
St
s'1
j
Nts
n'1
*t@Dtsn(wtsn!ctsn).
 Of course, it may not always make sense to sum diverse types of outputs.2
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3.2 Benefit-cost analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis
As defined above, depth is the social value of net gain, and net gain is worth to
users minus cost to users. Breadth is number of users, length is years of service, and
scope is the number of types of services. Next, I combine these six aspects in a formula
that, in principle, could be used to measure the social benefits of microfinance.
Let t index length in years from 1 to T. Let s  index scope as the number oft
types of services in year t from 1 to S . For a given service s  in year t, let breadth bet t
N , with each user indexed by n . Let the worth in year t of product s  to user n  bets ts t ts
w , and let the cost be c . Net gain is worth w  minus cost c .tsn tsn tsn tsn
The depth function D (w !c ) gives the social value of the net gain fromtsn tsn tsn
contract s  for client n  in year t. The general social-welfare function W(@) returns thet st
total social benefits b of net gains across users, services, and time:
(1)
Given a discount factor * and the assumption that W(@) is additively separable
across users, services, and time , social benefit b is:2
(2)
Benefit-cost analysis compares social costs c (Section 4 below) with social
benefits b. If b > c, then a project passes the benefit-cost test and is deemed a good
social investment. The measurement of social benefits b requires knowledge of worth to
Numberof outputs' S ' j
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users w , of costs to users c , and of the social value of net gains D (@). Suchtsn tsn tsn
knowledge is difficult to acquire; even an analyst somehow armed with measurements of
worth and costs would not know the form of the depth function D (@).tsn
To sidestep these measurement issues, cost-effectiveness analysis compares social
costs not with benefits but with outputs. Given that o  is the number of outputs oftsn
type s  for user n  in year t, cost-effectiveness replaces the measurement of socialt ts
benefits b with the measurement of the number of outputs S:
(3)
Most analyses look at only one service, so S  = 1 for all t. Also, mostt
microfinance organizations provide data on annual output but not on output for each
user. If O  is the total output of one type of service in a year, then (3) becomes:t
(4)
Define b¯ = b/S as (unmeasured) social benefit per unit of output, and define c¯ =
c/S as (measured) social cost per unit of output. Dividing both sides of the benefit-cost
criterion b > c by S then gives the cost-effectiveness criterion, b¯ > c¯. That is, a project
passes the cost-effectiveness test if unmeasured average social benefits b¯ are judged to
exceed measured average social costs c¯.
Why is this algebraic rearrangement helpful? After all, knowledge of average
social costs does not confer knowledge of average social benefits. In the imperfect world
of policy, however, knowledge of average costs may be better than nothing.
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Furthermore, people often find it easier to compare unmeasured average benefits with
average costs than to compare unmeasured total benefits with total costs. Finally, if
average social costs are very high or very low, then policymakers may feel confident
enough to judge whether average social benefits probably exceed average social costs.
3.3 Discounted output of Grameen, 1983-97
I estimate social costs c in Section 4 below. Here, I estimate the output S
produced by Grameen in the time frame 1983-97, the years for which data exist.
 The discount factor * defines the worth of output one year in the future in
terms of output now. To use * requires a choice of a social discount rate r, where * =
1/(1+r). The exact choice of r is one of the most-debated issues in policy analysis
(Brent, 1996; Katz and Welch, 1993; Markandya and Pearce, 1991). In practice,
however, the two biggest entities that do project analyses—the World Bank and the
U.S. government—set r at 10 percent per year in real terms (Belli, 1996; U.S. Office of
Management and Budget, 1972). This is arbitrary, but with a fixed budget, its
consistent use leads to the correct choice of projects. Furthermore, funds seem to run
out before projects whose benefits exceed costs at r = 0.10 (Quirk and Terasawa, 1991).
Of all the outputs of Grameen, I focus only on two: person-years of membership
and dollar-years of borrowed purchasing power. Membership confers access to all other
services and so in some sense encompasses all of them. Dollar-years of borrowed
purchasing power is the best summary of the extent of the use of loans because it
Disc. ave. stock' *(t @ (st! t@)st)%*
((
t @)st, where
*(t ' (*
t!*t!1)/ln* ,
)st ' st!st!1, and
*((t ' (ln*)
!2@{*t@ (t@ ln*!1)!*t!1@[(t!1)@ ln*!1]}.
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accounts for the amount disbursed, the term to maturity, and the repayment pattern.
In a given year, the raw number of person-years of membership is the average
number of members, and the raw number of dollar-years of borrowed purchasing power
is the average net loan portfolio. Thus both outputs are average stocks.
It is more complex to discount average stocks than to discount flows. Grameen,
like most microfinance organizations, reports stocks only at the start (s ) and end of at!1
year (s ). With linear change between the two endpoints, the daily average discount-t
weighted stock is not simply * @(s !s )/2 because the discount is a non-lineart!0.5 t t!1
function of time. Results in Schreiner (1997) imply:
(5)
For r = 0.10 in the time frame 1983-97, Grameen produced about 5.4 million
discounted person-years of membership (line Eo in Table 5). Likewise, it produced
about 0.5 billion discounted dollar-years of borrowed purchasing power (line En).
Is this a lot of output or a little? To compare the amount of output to the cost
of its production, the next section estimates the social cost of Grameen.
Socialcost' E0 % j
T
t'1
*t@FF t ! *
T@ET.
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4. A framework to measure social costs
I estimate social cost as the sum of all discounted cash flows from public entities
to Grameen minus all discounted cash flows from Grameen back to public entities,
supposing that Grameen was founded in 1983 and liquidated at the end of 1997.
Previous studies use ad hoc frameworks that ignore the need to discount.
Suppose that a microfinance organization is publicly owned. Then, given the
same discount factor * used for output, the simplest expression of social cost is the
equity E  that public entities put in the organization at the start of the time frame,0
plus the discounted fresh flows of funds FF  between public entities and thet
organization in year t, minus the discounted equity E  that public entities get backT
from the organization at the end of the time frame:
(6)
Measurement of the first and third terms (E  and E ) is simple; measurement of0 T
the second term (FF ) is complex. The rest of this section describes how to do this fort
Grameen as well as for most other microfinance organizations.
4.1 Cash flows with public and private entities
The formula for social cost excludes all cash flows with private entities. I assume
that private entities do their own cost-effectiveness analysis to judge whether a trade
will give them net gains. That is, assuming away externalities, the measure of social
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cost here ignores all private trades because they produce, at worst, a net gain of zero.
In contrast, funds allotted to microfinance organizations by employees of public
entities belong not to these employees but rather to society. The price charged—which
for gifts is zero—is not only set outside the market but may also lack any link to the
social worth of funds in alternative uses. The usefulness of cost-effectiveness analysis is
precisely as a check on the wisdom of choices made by public servants who do not
themselves bear most of the consequences of their choices.
Public entities are defined as those funded involuntarily by taxpayers. Private
entities are funded voluntarily. In the case of Grameen, the government of Bangladesh
bought stock and bonds. Likewise, Grameen borrowed from the public International
Fund for Agricultural Development and from the public development agencies of
Norway and Sweden. It has private debt from the Ford Foundation. Finally, all cash
flows between Grameen and its members are private. Members choose to join because
they expect that their benefits will exceed their costs.
 For 1984-85, 1988-93, and 1996-97, I use financial statements from the annual3
reports of Grameen. Data for the rest of the years are from Morduch (1999b), Hashemi
(1997), and Khandker, Khalily, and Khan (1995). Data for 1976-82 are unavailable.
The purchasing power of taka changed with time, so I convert all figures to constant
dollars. For stocks, I first multiply nominal taka at time t by the consumer price index
in Bangladesh as of December 31, 1998. I then divide by the consumer price index as of
time t and multiply by 1/48.5, the exchange rate between dollars and taka on
December 31, 1998. For flows, I use the method in Schreiner (1997) that accounts for
the fact that flows take place constantly but are reported only at the end of the year.
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4.2 Financial statements
I derive the cash flows of Grameen from its financial statements.  This is a weak3
link in the framework; accounting logic is seldom economic logic (Schreiner and Yaron,
1998). To complicate matters, Grameen, like most other microfinance organizations,
does not follow generally accepted accounting principles. The adjustments below aim to
remove most of the effects of this window-dressing.
4.2.1 The accounting treatment of grants
Grameen treats some grants not as equity but as liabilities. These funds are,
however, more like equity because they do not accrue interest and because they have no
set payback date. In the adjusted financial statements (Tables 2, 3, and 4), I count
these so-called liabilities as part of equity grants EG  (line Di in Table 4). Equityt
grants are the vast bulk of the net worth of Grameen.
Grameen does count some gifts as equity grants EG , but it also counts somet
gifts as revenue grants (RG , line Bp in Table 2). Grants are not the direct result oft
business operations, so they do not qualify as revenue and should be counted as
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injections to equity (e.g., Stickney and Weil, 1994). The arbitrary choice to count some
grants as revenue inflates profit and thus blurs the picture of business performance.
4.2.2 Discounts on expenses
Almost all microfinance organizations receive some grants in kind. Common
examples are fixed assets (land, buildings, or computers) and services (technical
assistance, deposit insurance, debt guarantees, or classes to train loan officers). Free
services are discounts on expenses (DX ). They should be accounted for as injections tot
equity equal to the market value of the service that is then offset by an equal expense.
Few organizations do this, however, and this inflates profits.
Grameen is exempt from reserve requirements on deposits; this is a discount on
expenses because it reduces the cost of funds. The annual reports also hint at—but do
not quantify—other discounts on expenses. I assume that discounts on expenses for
Grameen are zero in all years (line Bu of Table 2).
4.2.3 Expenses for provisions for loan losses
At disbursement, most banks recognize an expense for expected defaults (Koch,
1992). This reflects the belief that loan losses are caused not by weak enforcement of
repayment but rather by weak screening of borrowers. Thus standard practice is to
charge an expense for expected loan losses not to the year when a loan turned sour but
rather to the year when the loan was made.
 Provisions are estimates of the share of loans that, although good now, will4
someday go bad. Data on cumulative disbursements and repayments for “general” loans
suggest that, as widely reported, Grameen has collected about 98 percent of funds
disbursed and due. At the end of 1997, “general” loans were 83 percent of the portfolio,
and “housing” loans were the bulk of the rest. Because Grameen makes provisions at 5
percent of disbursements for “housing” loans, provisions as a share of total
disbursement should be 0.02@0.83+0.05@0.17 Ñ 0.025. Because “general” loans have one-
year terms, the amount disbursed in a year is about twice the balance outstanding. If
“housing” loans also had one-year terms, then provisions as a share of the balance
outstanding would be twice provisions as a share of disbursements, or 5 percent. In
fact, “housing” loans have longer terms, so the balance outstanding is less than twice
disbursement. In most years, however, Grameen has grown, and growth tends to make
disbursements exceed twice the balance outstanding. Thus, 5 percent is a reasonable
estimate of proper provisions as a share of balance outstanding. Morduch (1999b) uses
a different technique but comes up with this same figure.
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Grameen adjusts provisions for loan losses so as to post a small profit each year.
If profits with proper provision would have been negative, then Grameen reduced
provisions. If profits with proper provisions would have been very high, then Grameen
increased provisions. On net through time, Grameen provisioned too little; its reported
net portfolio of $260 million probably has $20 million which it will not collect and for
which it has not yet made provisions.
I adjust provisions so that the loan-loss reserve is always 5 percent of the gross
loan portfolio (lines Cb and Cc of Table 3).  I also write off each year an amount equal4
to the provision expense in the previous year. This changes the small reported profits
into big losses in 1983-94 and into big profits in 1995-97. The accumulated losses due to
proper provisions make total equity negative in 1987 (line Dp of Table 4).
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4.3 Other adjustments
4.3.1 Discount on public debt
The discount on public debt is defined as the savings that result from borrowing
from a public source rather than from a private source. The discount is D @(m !c ),t t t
where D  is average public debt, c  is the average interest rate paid for public debt, andt t
m  is the market interest rate for private debt of like risk. The market rate m  alwayst t
exceeds the public rate c ; if not, the organization would eschew public debt. Thet
discount on public debt needlessly corrupts reported profits; with a cash equity grant of
D @(m !c ), an organization could pay for private debt, have the same net cash flows,t t t
and yet not depress interest expenses (Inter-American Development Bank, 1994).
The choice of the market interest rate m is as difficult as the choice of the social
discount rate r. For Grameen, the cost to replace public debt with private debt in a
free market in unknown because the government pegs the market rate at 14 percent
and because the default risk of Grameen is unknown. To estimate m, I use an
algorithm from Benjamin (1994) that adjusts the prime rate for estimated risk. On
average in 1983-97, this risk-adjusted rate was 17 percent per year in nominal terms.
Like most other microfinance organizations, Grameen uses a lot of public debt.
In 1997, Grameen paid 5 percent for an average public debt of $187 million; the implied
discount was $23 million (lines Fa-Fd of Table 6). The undiscounted sum of these
Trueprofitt ' TPt ' Pt ! [RGt % Dt@(mt!ct) % DXt].
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subsidies from 1983-97 was $152 million. I assume that Grameen would not replace
public debt with deposits from members.
4.3.2 True Profit
True profit (TP ) is defined as what reported profits P  would be without thet t
arbitrary choice to count some grants not as injections to equity but rather as revenue
grants RG , discounts on public debt D @(m !c ), or discounts on expenses DX :t t t t t
(7)
In all years, true profit for Grameen is much smaller than reported profit, mostly
due to large discounts on public debt. For example, reported profit in 1997 was
$300,000, but true profit was -$23 million (line Fh of Table 6).
4.3.3 Ownership of shares
Most microfinance organizations are not-for-profits that do not sell shares nor
have formal owners. The shareholders of Grameen, however, are both public (the
Bangladesh government) and private (members). This affects the cash flows that are
assumed to come back to public entities at the end of the time frame because private
entities will have a legal claim on some share of equity at liquidation.
Define public paid-in capital (PC ) as the stock of paid-in capital from publicpubt
entities at time t, and define private paid-in capital (PC ) likewise. Public entities atprit
time t have a legal claim on a share $  of equity, where $  = PC  / (PC  + PC )t t pubt pubt prit
and where all values are in nominal terms.
The government of Bangladesh bought all of the first issue of Grameen shares in
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1983 (line Fi of Table 6). All subsequent sales were to members. By 1997, $ was 0.07,
and equity was $84 million. If Grameen had been liquidated, the government would
have received $6 million, and the 2.3 million members would have pocketed $78 million,
or $34 each. This means that a $2 share bought in 1987 would have earned a nominal
annual return of 33 percent. This handsome return is not due to the profitability of
Grameen but rather to grants from public entities that bolstered equity but that then
became the legal property of private shareholders.
4.3.4 Dividends and taxes
Unlike Grameen, some of the other top microfinance organizations in the world
have paid dividends, so the framework includes this possibility. I assume that dividends
Div  are distributed throughout the year and that public entities get a share $ .t t
Taxes are cash flows from a microfinance organization back to public entities.
Until September 1996, Grameen was tax-exempt. In 1997, Grameen made provisions for
tax on reported profits at the standard corporate rate of 40 percent. Of course, taxes
provide Grameen with one more reason to keep reported profits low.
4.4 The social cost of Grameen, 1983-97
The social cost of a microfinance organization is discounted cash flows from
public entities minus discounted cash flows back to public entities (equation 6). The
first outflow is the share of equity at time 0 that comes from public entities, * @$ @E  =0 0 0
$ @E . Seen from the start of the time frame, this is not a sunk flow because society0 0
FF t ' )EGt%)PCpubt%RGt%Dt@(mt!ct)%DXt!$t@Divt!Taxt.
Socialcost' $0@E0%j
T
t'1
*(t @FF t! *
T@$T@ET.
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could have used it in some other development project.
After the start, outflows of fresh funds FF  from public entities are the sum oft
the change in equity grants )EG , the change in public paid-in capital )PC , revenuet pubt
grants RG , discounts on public debt D @(m !c ), and discounts on expenses DX , lesst t t t t
the public share of dividends $ @Div  and taxes:t t
(8)
This accumulated annual flow is discounted by *  (Schreiner, 1997).t*
At the end of the time frame, public entities receive as in inflow a share $  ofT
end equity E . Total social cost is then discounted outflows minus discounted inflows:T
(9)
Assuming E  = 0, the social cost of Grameen for the time frame of 1983-97 was0
$107 million (Line Fl in Table 6). To judge whether this is high or low requires a
comparison of cost with output.
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5. Results and discussion
Was Grameen cost-effective? From 1983-97, it used $107 million to produce 5.4
million discounted person-years of membership, so the per-unit social cost was about
$20 (line Fm of Table 6). This means that if members, on average in each year, were
willing to bear at least $20 more cost than what they did in fact bear, then Grameen
was a good social investment. In terms of dollar-years of borrowed purchasing power,
Grameen produced 0.5 billion discounted units, so the per-unit social cost was about
$0.22 (line Fn of Table 6). Average social costs peaked in 1992.
These results are robust to the assumed social discount rate r and market
interest rate m (Table 7). For most reasonable pairs of m and r, the social cost per
person-year of membership is $15-25. Results are much more sensitive to m than to r.
Was Grameen a bargain or a swindle? The cost-effectiveness criterion requires
that social benefits per unit of output b¯ exceed social costs per unit of output c¯.
Although I have not estimated social benefits, the preponderance of the many imperfect
and incomplete attempts to measure benefits strongly suggests, in my judgement, that
social benefits did indeed exceed estimated average costs.
5.1 Evidence of benefits of Grameen
At the least, low drop-out rates (Khandker, Khalily, and Khan, 1995) signal that
average social benefits at Grameen were positive. If worth to users did not exceed cost
 Empowerment is not costless; conflicts related to Grameen sometimes prompt5
husbands to beat their wives (Rahman, 1999; Schuler, Hashemi, and Badal, 1998).
32
to users, then they would drop out. Of course, a positive sign on average net gain is
necessary but not sufficient for the size of average net gain to exceed average costs.
Several qualitative studies find that Grameen and/or its clones in Bangladesh
empower women (Amin, Becker, and Bayes, 1998; Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley, 1996).
For example, Larance (1998) finds that the weekly meetings help women to stretch and
to strengthen their support networks beyond their kin groups. They also offer women a
chance to gather in public and to hear their first names spoken with respect.5
According to Larance (1998, p. 30), “These findings suggest that the social implications
of microcredit lending can be as powerful as—or even more powerful than—the
economic implications.” Both types of impacts are real and important even though both
types remain unmeasured, at least in terms that can be directly compared with costs.
Schuler and Hashemi (1994) and Schuler, Hashemi, and Riley (1997) find that
Grameen increases the use of contraception. Although Grameen does not supply family-
planning services, members do vow to keep their families small, and loan officers may
prefer to lend to members with few children because they believe that children increase
default risk. Increased contraception has social benefits, albeit unquantified and
perhaps unquantifiable. Still, the gains are probably smaller than claimed; these studies
do not control for the chance that Grameen purposely puts branches in towns whose
residents are already more likely to use contraception nor for the chance that the
33
women who join Grameen are also already more likely to use contraception. Pitt and
Khandker (1996) control for non-random placement and for self-selection and find that
Grameen does not affect contraception.
In the economic sphere, the first study to use a control group found that
membership in Grameen increased annual household income by 43 percent (Hossain,
1988). Pitt and Khandker (1998) used different data and controlled for unobserved
heterogeneity at the individual, household, and village levels. They found that annual
household expenditure increased by $18 for each additional $100 of cumulative
disbursement. If this effect persists through time and if the average effect exceeds the
marginal effect, then the average increase in household expenditure by itself would
provide at least $0.09 of the benefit required to compensate for the average social cost
of $0.22 per dollar-year of borrowed purchasing power.
Pitt and Khandker (1998) also found that non-land assets of women increased
by $27 for each additional $100 of cumulative disbursement. Furthermore, a 1 percent
increase in cumulative disbursement to a woman increased the likelihood of school
attendance by 0.028 for boys and by 0.019 for girls. These benefits, big as they may be,
are not directly comparable to measures of average cost.
Morduch (1998) points out a flaw in Pitt and Khandker (1998); controls include
only households with less than half an acre of land even though new members of
Grameen often own more than half an acre (Matin, 1998). To correct this, Morduch
drops from the sample Grameen households with more than half an acre. He also
34
replaces Pitt and Khandker’s complex weighted exogenous sampling maximum
likelihood/limited information maximum likelihood/fixed effects estimator with a simple
difference-in-differences estimator. Finally, Morduch estimates the effects not of
borrowing but of eligibility to borrow. The benefits found by Pitt and Khandker (1998)
disappear; access does not increase expenditure nor school attendance. Access to
Grameen did, however, smooth consumption and labor supply across seasons. This
makes sense; loans help households to diversify activities (Rutherford, 1998), and
Grameen also supplies implicit insurance. For households near subsistence, a
strengthened buffer between them and hunger can be almost priceless.
Finally, Khandker, Samad, and Kahn (1998) use this same data, but they do not
drop Grameen households above the half-acre cut-off. They find that the presence of a
Grameen branch in a village increases the average wage by 14 percent and production
per household by 50 percent.
Each of these attempts to measure social benefits has weaknesses. If any one of
the positive estimates are correct, however, then Grameen probably had more average
social benefits than average social costs. Although the gains are probably smaller than
the biggest estimates, Grameen most likely did have positive impacts in all these areas.
I find it difficult to imagine how Grameen could not affect the lives of its members. My
guess is that Grameen was a cost-effective social investment. My aim here has been to
make explicit the logic and assumptions that support this subjective judgement so that
future work can improve it.
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5.2 Implications for microfinance as a whole
What does the likely cost-effectiveness of Grameen mean for the worldwide
microfinance movement that Grameen inspired and still leads? If Grameen, one of the
best microfinance organizations, were a bad investment, then it would probably make
sense to give up hope for most of the thousands of others. But Grameen probably was a
good investment.
Does this mean that most other microfinance organizations are also good
investments? No. Although Grameen’s badness would condemn them, Grameen’s
goodness does not necessarily save them. One happy ending does not a microfinance
movement make, and most organizations do not perform as well as Grameen. Yet they
may still be good investments. Grameen offers hope; just as it did well, microfinance
may yet succeed.
Future work should aim to replace hope with knowledge. For Grameen, I have
guessed that unmeasured benefits exceed measured costs. The size of the difference is
unknown, however, and even costs are unknown for other microfinance organizations.
Cost-effectiveness analysis is an inexpensive first step to improve allocations. For
example, average costs may be compared across organizations with similar products,
users, and contexts. All else constant, society would prefer suppliers with lower average
costs. Furthermore, although cost-effectiveness analysis does not identify those
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organizations with the highest benefits net of costs, it can help to detect grossly
inefficient cases where average costs likely exceed all reasonable estimates of benefits.
Finally, the research agenda should include a framework to measure two types of
costs and benefits external to the users of a given organization. The first type of
externalities affects the family of users or the local competitors of users. The second
type of externalities accrues worldwide. The best (and worst) microfinance
organizations inspire (and thwart) efforts and budgets far beyond their own markets
and borders. For example, Grameen may be a good social investment for its users, but
it may be a bad social investment for the world if the microfinance movement that it
inspired turns out to be a worse way to help the poor than the projects that were left
unfunded due to the growth of microfinance.
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199719961995199419931992199119901989198819871986198519841983SourceFor the year ended Dec. 31Line
Bangladesh
45.542.540.840.339.939.038.635.832.332.331.230.831.026.025.2DataExchange rate (Tk/$)Aa
3.64.13.64.74.01.51.911.88.65.911.110.618.48.612.0DataBangladesh inflationAb
5.34.33.85.04.30.82.213.49.58.814.412.121.88.012.0DataBangladesh inflation (Port. wgt. ave.)Ac
14.014.014.014.515.015.116.014.312.012.012.012.012.012.012.0DataBangladesh prime (Simple ave.)Ad
14.914.014.014.415.015.015.914.612.012.012.012.012.012.012.0DataBangladesh prime (Port. wgt. ave.)Ae
12412212011511311110910710510310199.297.495.693.9DataPopulation (millions)Af
288279270254261270286286256252240249243233210DataGNP/capita (Dec. 1998 $)Ag
USA
1.43.32.52.72.72.93.16.14.64.54.31.13.83.93.8DataUSA inflationAh
1.83.32.52.72.62.83.16.04.54.512.81.33.83.63.8DataUSA inflation (Port. wgt. ave.)Ai
8.48.38.87.06.06.38.610.010.99.28.28.410.0NANADataUSA prime (Simple ave.)Aj
9.08.38.87.26.06.28.410.010.99.48.38.39.9NANADataUSA prime (Port. wgt. ave.)Ak
5.15.05.54.23.03.55.57.58.16.65.86.07.59.68.6DataUSA T-bill rate (Simple ave.)Al
5.45.05.54.33.03.45.47.58.16.85.95.97.49.68.7DataUSA T-bill rate (Port. wgt. ave.)Am
Source: IMF and World Bank, various issues
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Table 1: Macroeconomic variables for Bangladesh and U.S.A., 1983-97
199719961995199419931992199119901989198819871986198519841983SourceFor the year ended Dec. 31Line
49.940.546.741.227.313.58.055.985.073.872.431.801.651.220.01DataRev. LendingBa
12.010.04.76.74.44.64.133.552.351.802.241.871.400.630.04DataRev. investmentsBb
11.79.28.76.73.92.61.861.441.030.720.470.310.190.100.02DataExp. Int. deps.Bc
0.20.30.21.41.30.90.150.120.160.140.140.000.090.030.00DataExp. Int. private debtBd
8.48.28.07.52.80.90.931.141.050.810.690.971.100.700.06DataExp. Int. public debtBe
41.732.734.532.223.713.69.236.835.184.003.382.401.671.02(0.03)Ba+Bb-(Bc+Bd+Be)    Fin. marginBf
0.40.30.50.70.30.20.200.080.080.020.020.030.000.000.00DataRev. Other op.Bg
000000000000000DataExp. Other op.Bh
14.312.112.713.110.85.22.882.472.121.641.120.640.460.400.22DataExp. Loan-loss prov.Bi
(0.1)(0.1)(0.1)0.00.00.00.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.00DataExp. Extraord. write-offs (net)Bj
21.618.316.814.715.010.17.254.963.792.782.441.791.180.490.08DataExp. PersonnelBk
5.14.54.25.83.93.23.033.312.831.910.890.520.390.240.09DataExp. administrationBl
0.70.70.61.50.50.50.460.320.250.100.070.100.050.040.01DataExp. DepreciationBm
0.4(2.4)0.8(2.2)(6.1)(5.1)(4.19)(4.15)(3.74)(2.41)(1.13)(0.62)(0.41)(0.15)(0.41)Bf+Bg-(Bh+Bi+Bj+Bk+Bl+Bm)    Op. MarginBn
0.00.00.00.00.50.50.190.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.00DataRev. Extraord. (net)Bo
2.92.42.01.92.21.61.982.201.871.160.110.000.000.030.01DataRev. grants, RGBp
3.30.12.8(0.3)(3.3)(3.0)(2.02)(1.95)(1.87)(1.25)(1.01)(0.62)(0.41)(0.11)(0.40)Bn+Bo+Bp    Net income before taxes, PBq
0.100000000000000DataTaxes on net income, TaxBr
0.000000000000000DataDividends declared, Div.Bs
3.20.12.8(0.3)(3.3)(3.0)(2.02)(1.95)(1.87)(1.25)(1.01)(0.62)(0.41)(0.11)(0.40)Bq-(Br+Bs)    Change Retained earnings, REBt
000000000000000DataNote: Disc. op. exp., DXBu
Source: Grameen and calculations of the author. Monetary figures in millions of Dec. 1998 $.
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Table 2: Adjusted income statement of Grameen, 1983-97
199719961995199419931992199119901989198819871986198519841983SourceFor the year ended Dec. 31Line
1071459686533840.731.121.114.415.117.810.28.52.2DataCash and short-term invest.Ca
26523625325423411965.151.545.534.821.112.110.28.94.1DataPort. (gross)Cb
(13)(12)(13)(13)(11)(5)(2.9)(2.3)(2.1)(1.6)(1.1)(0.6)(0.4)(0.4)(0.2)DataReserve loan lossesCc
25222424024222311362.249.243.433.220.011.59.88.53.9Cb+Cc    Port. (net), LPCd
1615141313119.27.24.93.82.31.30.40.20.1DataFixed assets (net)Ce
0000335.17.28.55.20.00.00.00.00.0DataLong-term invest.Cf
31344425233.77.15.13.25.23.32.31.40.2DataOther assetsCg
40641939436529416912110283.159.842.733.822.718.76.4Ca+Cd+Ce+Cf+Cg    Total AssetsCh
99878278693927.120.415.310.87.74.83.42.01.0DataDep. libsCi
61142221.81.82.00.62.10.22.00.10.1DataPrivate debtCj
1771971951971374848.649.852.040.331.527.816.715.84.6DataPublic debtCk
403536271674.94.63.02.31.90.80.00.00.0DataOther Libs.Cl
3223303183052249682.476.772.454.043.233.522.217.95.8Ci+Cj+Ck+Cl    Total Libs.Cm
Source: Grameen and calculations of the author. Monetary figures in millions of Dec. 1998 $.
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Table 3: Adjusted assets and liabilities of Grameen, 1983-97
199719961995199419931992199119901989198819871986198519841983SourceFor the year ended Dec. 31Line
(13.4)(13.4)(16.2)(15.9)(12.6)(9.7)(7.63)(5.68)(3.81)(2.56)(1.55)(0.92)(0.52)(0.40)0.00Dc(t-1)Start Retained earningsDa
3.20.12.8(0.3)(3.3)(3.0)(2.02)(1.95)(1.87)(1.25)(1.01)(0.62)(0.41)(0.11)(0.40)BtChange Retained earnings, REDb
(10.2)(13.4)(13.4)(16.2)(15.9)(12.6)(9.65)(7.63)(5.68)(3.81)(2.56)(1.55)(0.92)(0.52)(0.40)Da+Db    End Retained earningsDc
(10.6)(8.1)(6.6)(3.8)(1.7)(1.5)(0.99)(0.06)0.300.190.150.160.230.200.00Df(t-1)Start Reserves and adj.Dd
(4.1)(2.5)(1.5)(2.8)(2.1)(0.3)(0.46)(0.94)(0.35)0.100.04(0.01)(0.08)0.030.20DataChange Reserves and adj.De
(14.7)(10.6)(8.1)(6.6)(3.8)(1.7)(1.45)(0.99)(0.06)0.300.190.150.160.230.20Dd+De    End Reserves and adj.Df
105.891.076.384.783.045.630.8713.496.83(0.15)(0.07)(0.30)(0.27)(0.17)0.00Di(t-1)Start Equity grantsDg
(4.2)14.814.7(8.4)1.737.414.7617.376.666.98(0.07)0.22(0.03)(0.10)(0.17)DataChange Equity grants, EGDh
101.6105.891.076.384.783.045.6230.8713.496.83(0.15)(0.07)(0.30)(0.27)(0.17)Dg+Dh    End Equity grantsDi
1.01.01.01.01.01.01.001.001.001.001.001.001.001.000.00Dl(t-1)Start Paid-in cap. publicDj
0.00.00.00.00.00.00.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.001.00DataChange Paid-in cap. public, PCpubDk
1.01.01.01.01.01.01.001.001.001.001.001.001.001.001.00Dj+Dk    End Paid-in cap. publicDl
6.05.95.74.14.03.11.971.971.511.020.790.570.370.000.00Do(t-1)Start Paid-in cap. privateDm
0.30.10.21.60.00.91.140.000.460.490.230.210.210.370.00DataChange Paid-in cap. private, PCpriDn
6.36.05.95.74.14.03.111.971.971.511.020.790.570.370.00Dm+Dn    End Paid-in cap. privateDo
84.188.976.460.270.073.638.6325.2110.735.83(0.50)0.320.510.810.63Dc+Df+Di+Dl+Do    Total EquityDp
Source: Grameen and calculations of the author. Monetary figures in millions of Dec. 1998 $.
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Table 4: Adjusted equity of Grameen, 1983-97
Grameen: Discounted outputs
1997199619951994199319921991199019891988198719861985198419831982SourceFor the year ended Dec. 31Line
25222424024222311362.249.243.433.220.011.59.758.523.921.95CdNet portfolio outstandingEa
2,2732,0602,0662,0131,8151,4241,06687066249033923417212158.330.4DataMembers outstanding (thousands)Eb
27.4-15.61-1.51618.2611051.0413.065.71110.2413.178.5081.7731.2384.5981.966NAEa-Ea(t-1)Change in portfolio in yearEc
213-6.15152.53198.2390.5358196.9207.3171.9151.2104.862.7250.5762.7327.9NAEb-Eb(t-1)Change in members in year (thousands)Ed
0.1000.1000.1000.1000.1000.1000.1000.1000.1000.1000.1000.1000.1000.1000.1000.100DataSocial discount rate, rEe
0.9090.9090.9090.9090.9090.9090.9090.9090.9090.9090.9090.9090.9090.9090.9090.9091/(1+Ee)Social discount factor, DeltaEf
-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095-0.095ln EfNatural log of DeltaEg
1514131211109876543210Eh(t-1)+1Year tEh
0.2390.2630.2900.3190.3500.3860.4240.4670.5130.5640.6210.6830.7510.8260.9091.000Ef^EhDelta^tEi
0.2510.2760.3040.3340.3680.4050.4450.4890.5380.5920.6510.7170.7880.8670.954NA[Ei-Ei(t-1)]/EgDelta*tEj
3.643.7283.7973.8423.8583.843.7793.6673.4953.2532.9262.5021.9641.2940.469NAEg^(-2)*{Ei*(Eh*Eg-1)-Ei(t-1)*[(Eh-1)*Eg-1]}Delta**tEk
59.864.273.277.661.635.324.722.620.615.710.27.617.195.362.78NAEj*(Ea-Eh*Ec)+Ek*EcDisc. portfolioEl
54457062063959450343037431024518614511577.342.1NAEj*(Eb-Eh*Ed)+Ek*EdDisc. membersEm
48942936529121415211792.169.548.933.222.915.38.142.780En(t-1)+ElAccum. disc. portfolioEn
5,3944,8504,2813,6613,0222,4271,9241,4941,12081156638023411942.10Eo(t-1)+EmAccum. disc. members (thousands)Eo
Source: Grameen and calculations of the author. Monetary figures in millions of Dec. 1998 $.
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Table 5: Discounted outputs of Grameen, 1983-97
1997199619951994199319921991199019891988198719861985198419831982SourceFor the year ended Dec. 31Line
18719619616792.648.249.250.946.235.929.622.216.210.22.30NA[Ck(t-1)+Ck]/2Ave. Public debt, DFa
0.050.040.040.040.030.020.020.020.020.020.020.040.070.070.03NABe/FaRate paid public debt, cFb
0.170.170.170.170.170.170.170.170.170.170.170.170.170.170.17NADataMarket rate for private debt, mFc
23.425.125.320.913.07.247.437.516.805.294.352.821.661.030.33NAFa*(Fc-Fb)    Disc. public debt, D*(m-c)Fd
3.320.072.78(0.26)(3.31)(2.99)(2.02)(1.95)(1.87)(1.25)(1.01)(0.62)(0.41)(0.11)(0.40)NABqNet income before taxes, PFe
2.902.441.971.912.251.611.982.201.871.160.110.000.000.030.01NABpRev. grants, RGFf
000000000000000NABuDisc. op. exp., DXFg
(22.9)(27.4)(24.5)(23.1)(18.5)(11.8)(11.4)(11.7)(10.5)(7.70)(5.48)(3.44)(2.07)(1.17)(0.74)NAFe-(Ff+Fd+Fg)    True profit, TPFh
0.070.080.080.080.120.120.160.250.250.320.430.510.600.711.000DataPublic share of paid-in capital, BetaFi
0000000000000000Fi0*Dp0Beta0*E0Fj
10810391.078.273.467.248.537.724.516.28.275.413.231.941.110Fk(t-1)+Ej*(Dh+Dk+Bp+Fd+Bu-Fi*Bs-Br)Accum. disc. fresh fundsFk
107100.989.376.770.563.845.934.823.115.28.415.303.011.470.54NAFj+Fk-Fi*Ei*DpSocial costFl
19.820.820.920.923.326.323.923.320.618.714.914.012.812.312.8NAFl/(Eo/1000)Social cost/person-year of membership ($)Fm
0.220.240.240.260.330.420.390.380.330.310.250.230.200.180.19NAFl/EnSocial cost/dollar-year of debt ($)Fn
Source: Grameen and calculations of the author. Monetary figures in millions of Dec. 1998 $.
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Table 6: Social cost and cost-effectiveness of Grameen, 1983-97
m
0.290.270.250.230.210.190.170.150.130.110.090.070.050.030.010r
28.026.424.823.221.720.118.516.915.313.812.210.69.07.45.85.10.00
28.226.725.123.521.920.418.817.215.614.012.510.99.37.76.25.40.02
28.526.925.323.822.220.619.017.515.914.312.811.29.68.06.55.70.04
28.727.125.624.022.420.919.317.716.214.613.011.59.98.36.86.00.06
29.027.425.824.322.721.119.618.016.414.913.311.710.28.67.06.20.08
29.227.626.124.522.921.419.818.216.715.113.512.010.48.87.36.50.10
29.427.826.324.723.121.620.018.516.915.313.812.210.69.17.56.70.12
29.628.126.524.923.421.820.218.717.115.514.012.410.89.37.76.90.14
29.828.326.725.123.622.020.418.817.315.714.112.611.09.47.97.10.16
30.028.526.925.323.722.220.619.017.415.914.312.711.19.68.07.20.18
30.228.627.125.523.922.320.719.217.616.014.412.911.39.78.17.30.20
30.428.827.225.624.022.520.919.317.716.114.513.011.49.88.27.40.22
30.528.927.425.824.222.621.019.417.816.214.613.011.49.98.37.50.24
30.729.127.525.924.322.721.119.517.916.314.713.111.59.98.37.50.26
30.829.227.626.024.422.821.219.617.916.314.713.111.59.98.37.50.28
30.929.327.726.124.422.821.219.618.016.414.713.111.59.98.37.50.30
Source: Author's calculations.
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Table 7: Sensitivity of average cost per person-year of membership
